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CHAPTER I 
TEE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
After World War IIJ~the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
became a "Great Power," surpassed in might by only the United States. 
The foreign policy of the Soviet Union now exerts a tremendous 
influence on the international scene, making the study of Soviet 
policies a "must" for the student of international affairs. The 
question of the role of international law in the foreign relations 
of the U.S.S.R. is an interesting and important one. Are changes in 
the international system reflected in Soviet views of international 
law? Have the Soviet theories had significant impacts on the actions 
of other states? To what extent does international law influence 
Soviet actions and vice versa? This paper will answer these questions 
by considering some aspects of Soviet trends in international law in 
recent years. 
This study, because of the vastness of the subject, is not 
comprehensive. The emphasis is on public international law, con-
cerned with governmental relations, private international law being 
only occasional~ mentioned where it seemed appropriate. This can be 
justified by the relative unimportance of private transactions in 
relations with the Soviet Union due to the restricted nature of 
individual contacts with the Soviet Union. Trade relations and 
economic aspects of Soviet international law are also considered 
only when pertinent to general trends in an area being considered. 
Otherwise, the study is composed of topics on which Soviet inter-
pretations of international law exert influence on policies or 
describe the reasons for Soviet action. Treaties, international 
organizations, customary law, law influencing relations with the 
"Third World," and, finally, the international law of socialist 
countries are discussed. 
A brief examination of the nature of international law is 
helpful in understanding the Soviet interpretations. What is the 
definition of international law and what is its role in inter-
national law and what is its role in international affairs 1 The 
official Soviet definition is as follows: 
International law can be defined as the aggregate of 
rules governing relations between States in the process of 
their conflict and co-operation, designed to safeguard their 
peaceful coexistence, expressing the will of the ruling 
classes of these States and defended in case of need by 1 coercion applied by States individually or collectively. 
This statement has phrases of high ideological content 
("peaceful coexistence" and "ruling classes"), yet it points out 
some of the distinguishing features of international law. 
First, international law is a relatively loose "aggregate 
of rules , 11 not a formal system of law as can be found in a 
lrnternational Law, Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., 
Institute of State and Law (Hoscow: Foreign Languages Publishing 
House, 1963) P• 7. 
2 
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national government. There is no central authority defining the law 
and enforcing it. Some students of international relations assert 
that international law does not really qualify as law at all, and 
that it has little relevance in regulating the actions of states. 
This view is as biased as one which sees international law as the 
key to a utopian world in the future. In reality, the bulk of inter-
national law concerns the regulation of non-controversial routine 
transactions among the states, acting to formalize these relationships. 
One aim of international law is to control the behaviour of nations. 
This is the most controversial of its functions. It is the occasional 
failure of this function in times of crisis that leads some to believe 
that international law is of little value. These persons do not 
realize the number of crises avoided because states obeyed the law. 
A second elem.ent,following from the first, is the consensual 
nature of law in the international system. Of course, all systems of 
law must be based on a substantial degree of agreement--law cannot be 
enforced if the members of the system are not willing to accept it. 
This is all the more true of international law because of the 
decentralized nature of the system. A nation makes international 
agreements that are in that nation's interests and will abide by 
those agreements unless it is to that nation's advantage to violate 
them despite the costs of such violations. In other words, much of 
law is based on self-interest, keeping in mind that self-interest 
includes the necessity of accepting some restrictions on one's 
freedom of action. 
4 
The third point to consider is that international law is 
"defended in case of' need by coercion applied by States individually 
or collectively." Once again, the cause is the lack of a central 
government. There is no international body with the power to force 
submission of disputes for settlement. The necessity of self-help on 
the part of nation-states creates the possibility of violence 
resulting from attempts to punish violations of international law. 
A state, however, must take this risk into consideration when it con-
siders violating international law. Often the risk is strong enough 
to result in the exercise of self-restraint by the state.2 
"Every state derives some benefits from international law," 
says Louis Henkin.3 The Soviet Union is, of course, no exception. 
Some critics of the Soviet Union say that the Russians have misused 
their "benefits" and have tried to deny those benefits to others. 
The Soviet Union generally has frankly used and continues to use 
international law as an instrument of foreign policy. This will be 
shown throughout the paper. It is pointless to condemn the Soviet 
Union for this since, to a large extent, every nation does the same, 
although less openly. Some examples of United States policies will 
illustrate. 
2The preceding summary of the operation and nature of inter-
national law is essentially the thesis of Louis Henkin, 
How Nations Behave (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968) 
3Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1968), P• 32 
The connection between the development of international 
law and the needs of foreign policy is a close one, policy often 
exerting a formative influence on legal theories. Yet sometimes 
the two are not easily reconciled. Therefore, a dichotomy between 
theory and practice often appears. This dichotomy is an important 
feature that is found throughout the discussion. 
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We have commented on the nature of international law and 
the striking characteristics on Soviet practice of it. So that the 
consideration of recent Soviet trends of the past fifteen years or 
so may be seen in the proper perspective, the discussion will begin 
with a historical sketch of the development of Soviet L~ternational 
law. 
CHAPTER II 
THE DEVELOP:t'.ENT OF SOVIET INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Soviet international law, both theory and practice, has 
changed tremendously from the establishment of the revolutionary 
new state of 1917 to the established world power of today. To 
understand Soviet policies today, however, it is helpful to under-
stand their origins. As with all things Soviet, the theory of 
international la.v.r is expounded in terms of }Jarxism-Ieninism. Without 
some background in ¥~rxism-Ieninism, the Westerner cannot accurately 
analyze Soviet claims. Theory of international lav-1 has continued to 
develop and change, as has the practice. Quite often the actual 
working (or not working) of international law in Soviet foreign policy 
reveals much more than the statements of Soviet legal authorities. 
A survey of these theories and practices reveals the close relation-
ship between the development of Soviet international law and foreign 
policy. 
Karl 1-la.rx, the original authority for Communist thought, is 
always consulted first, of course. ¥arx had nothing to say on inter-
national law itself, which simplifies the task of justifying new 
theories in ¥~rxist ter~$. His theories on the nature of the state 
6 
7 
and of lav1 are often referred to, and the need to put policies in 
¥~rxist-Leninist terms exerts a shaping influence to form, if not 
content. His primary thesis was that social institutions, including 
law, rest on the economic structure of society. 
In the social production of their life, men enter into 
definite relations ••• which correspond to a definite state 
of development of their material productive forces. The sum 
total of these relations of production constitutes the economic 
structure of society, the real foundati~n, on which rises a 
legal and political superstructure ••• 
Had :Marx commented on international lav1 of his time, he would have 
said that it was based on the bourgeois class domination of the 
states in the international system. How to explain international law 
operating in a \>JOrld \>There both capitalist and socialist economic 
systems exist has posed a sticky problem for the Soviets. Various 
attempts have been made, none of which have solved the problem.2 
It is interesting to note that ¥~rx did not advocate violation 
of bourgeois international lavr. Narx is quoted in the Soviet inter-
national law textbook as saying, 11 Viola.tions of l.a.v1 can never be 
allowed to supplant the la\-7 itself •• a The law based on bourgeois 
domination was to be overthrown by the proletarian revolution. Marx 
predicted that the revolution, beginning in advanced industrial 
countries, would spread through the working classes everywhere and 
1Karl ~arx, Preface to The Critique of Political Econo§Y from 
Selected Works (2 vols.; Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
1950), PP• 328-329. 
2Kazimierz Grzybowski, Soviet Public International Law 
(Durham, N.C.: Rule of Law Press, 1970), pp. 4-17. 
3International law, p. 59. 
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become international. When socialism was achieved, there would be no 
state and no law, international or otherwise. 
lenin 
Lenin--philosopher, revolutionary, and statesman--is an 
important figure, for it is he who first deals with international law 
as the leader of the new Soviet state. Before the Revolution of 1917, 
he faithful~ followed Marxist doctrines, adding his conviction of the 
inevitability of violent revolution under the leadership of an elite 
of professional revolutionaries. His work Imperialism, the Highest 
Stage of Capitalism explained how the revolution could first occur in 
Russia. The system of capitalism was now world-wide, supported by the 
exploitation of backward areas. Starting at the weakest lim< of the 
capitalist system, the revolution would become international. Later 
Soviet theories of international law--self-determination, just wars, 
and wars of national liberation, especially--were to be backed by 
references to this work.4 
In November of 1917~the Bolsheviks with Lenin at their head 
seized power. The victorious revolutionaries looked for the revolu-
tion to spread throughout Europe. It was not until several years 
later that they realized that world revolution was·i-o be long delayed. 
Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks rejected "imperialist" international law, 
repudiating the agreements and treaties, as well as the debts,of 
tsarist regina~ World-wide proletarian cooperation would soon replace 
--
4Ibid., PP• 61-62. 
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international law, they thought. Lenin's Decree on Peace called for 
immediate peace without annexations or indemnities and for self-
determination of peoples, bringing to mind the idealistic goals of 
Woodrow Wilson. 
Reality forced the revolutionary state to amend its views and 
its practices. The Soviet state, torn by civil war, found itself 
surrounded by hostile capitalist states, alienated by the threats of 
overthrow. Lenin, the master politician and statesman, saw that, if 
the revolution was not to be destroyed, the Soviet government must 
survive. While in theory/ Lenin continued to stress that legality 
was determined by the socialist element, in practice Lenin's policies 
toward international law were dictated by what he saw as the most 
beneficial solution for the state.5 The Decree on Peace failed with 
the Treaty of Brest-Litovskf 1Mking peace~with the Germans. Turning 
to bourgeois international law, Lenin used it to condemn and to help 
prevent foreign intervention as had taken place during the Civil War. 
\,1\ 
He skillfully employed international law l making the Rapallo Treaty 
with Germany and trade agreements with Great Britain to break 
through the isolation of the Soviet Union during the NEP period in 
6 
the early twenties. 
5Ivo La. penna, "Lenin, Law, and legality'' in lenin: The .Man, 
the Theorist, the Leader, edited by leonard Shapiro and Peter 
Reddaway, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 262. 
6Kurt L:mdon, "Soviet Foreign Policy: Fifty Years of Dualism," 
in The Soviet Union: A Half-Centur of Communism, edited by Kurt 
London, Baltimore: Johns Hospkins Press, 1968 , pp. 336-338. 
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lenin stressed the virtue of flexibility. In addition to 
making new international agreements, he even renewed some of the 
tsarist treaties that he had formerly repudiated, where they did not 
contradict socialist principles. This flexibility also extended to 
the· keeping of agreements o "Promises are like pie crusts, made to be 
broken," he said, quoting an English proverb, 7 If the situation so 
indicated, Lenin did not hesitate to violate an agreement, Needless 
to say, this practice fostered a strong distrust of Soviet reliability. 
Yet the need for peaceful relations vTith other states encouraged lenin 
to somewhat moderate his actions. The conflict begun in this period 
between the world communist movement and the interests of the Soviet 
state in Russia created a dualism in Soviet foreign policy that 
influenced Soviet international law.? 
Stalin 
The outcome of the pOiver struggle follovdng lenin's death in 
1924 was the concentration of power in the hands of Stalin, The 
theory of permanent revolution, held by the defeated Trotsky emphasized 
the spread of the communist movement and, undoubtedly, would have taken 
a more revolutionary view of international la1-1. Stalin's concern, 
even more so than Lenin's, was the survival and strengthening of the 
Soviet Union. "Socialism in one country" became the slogan. Stalin 
?v. I. Lenin, quoted in Nathan leites, A Study of Bolshevism 
(New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1953) pp. 532-33. 
8 london, P• 327. 
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began a program of normalization of relations with capitalist 
countries, especially in trade. This implied recognition and accept-
ance of international law, although the Soviet state continued to 
express the need for a socialist system of international law,9 
With plans for world revolution shelved, new theories of 
international relations developed. A dualistic tactic-theory of 
cooperation and competition explained the communist position. 
Competition between the capitalist and socialist systems would con-
tinue in the economic sphere, In international law and governmental 
relations, the Soviet Union would cooperate with the capitalists. 
Stalin, treating international law as a convenient tool of foreign 
,, 
I 
policy, found ~~ useful. His approach to international law was 
eclectic, accepting some concepts and rejecting others. The U.S.S.R. 
stru~gled for recognition of a socialist international law that would 
give them more influence on the interpretation of international law,10 
The Comintern, formed in 1919 to organize the world revolution, was not 
under the complete control of the Soviet government and was used to 
back up Soviet demands. 
Shifts in Stalin's policies in international law took place 
in the thirties due mainly to concern for Soviet security. The Soviet 
Union had been hostiJBto the formation of the League o~ Nations, seeing 
it with some justification as an imperialist organi~ation,to protect 
9Ibid.' p. 332 
10Grzybowsky, Soviet ·Public International Law, pp. 10-16. 
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capitalist claims in the world system. The rise of Naziism 
influenced Stalin to look more favorably at the peacekeeping 
potentials of the League. In 19)4, the U.S.S.R. became a member of 
that organization. During the five years of its membership, the 
Soviet Union was the staunchest supporter of the legal regulations of 
the league. The Soviet experiment in international organization 
ended in disillusionment, when the league failed to keep peace and 
restrain Fascism. To buy time, Stalin signed a nonaggression pact with 
Germany. When war broke out in Europe, the Soviets condemned it as 
another war of imperialism.11 
World War II and After 
The German invasion of Russia on June 22, 1941, transformed 
the imperialist war overnight into a patriotic struggle in defense of 
socialism and the Soviet Union. Alliances with capitalist nations 
(the Allies) were formed, a.nd to please them, the Comintern was simply 
dissolved. The triumph of the "patriotic struggle" reshaped the 
Soviet world position and its views on international lavr. In the wake 
of retreating German armies, the Soviets set up a series of socialist 
states that remained under the control of the Kremlin. Socialism in 
one country was no more, and for the first time international 
socialist law was possible. The successful Communist revolution in 
China in 1~9 added another socialist state. Socialist principles of 
11London, pp. 342-}44. 
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international law emphasizing sovereignty and self-determination were 
set up, although in reality the satellite states were almost completely 
dominated by~mscow. This dichotomy led to the disintegration of 
cooperation within the Eastern bloc. 12 
The Soviet Union ~Ade important contributions to the shaping 
of international law after World War II through participation in the 
forming of the United Nations. The quick deterioration of the war-time 
alliance soon grew into the Cold War, Stalin re-activated the two-
camp theory of struggle between capitalism and socialism. This con-
flict betvreen the Soviet Union and the United States was perhaps the 
most important feature of the post-war international system, The 
international legal theory of the Soviet Union reflected their per-
ception of the Western nations as hostile to Corr~unist survival. 13 
Khrushchev 
A new phase in Soviet foreign affairs began with Khrushchev's 
rise to po-vrer in 19.54, following the death of Stalin. The new leader 
----------~~---
made some rr.ajor adjustments in theory and practice. "Peaceful 
Coexistence," a theory that both capitalist and socialist states 
could exist in the international system, their competition taking place 
through mostly peaceful means, was developed. A drive to have Peaceful 
Coexistence accepted and codified as a principle of international la~1 
12Kazimierz Grzybowski, The Socialist Commonwealth of Nations 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 248-249. 
13Jan F, Triska and David D. Finley, Soviet Foreign Policy 
(London: ~.acmillan Company, 1968), PP• 21-22, 
14 
was vigorously, though not successfully pursued. Khrushchev endorsed 
a three-camp concept of the world, (replacing Stalin's two-camp theory), 
which recognized the existence of the new and nonaligned nations. 
During the Khrushchev years, the Soviet Union became more comfortable 
in its position as a superpower with interests to protect. The Soviet 
Union's cla~$ to being a revolutionary state became faint indeed. 
It became more willing to recognize the value of stability fostered 
by international law.14 
Khrushchev announced the development of a socialist system of 
international law. The guiding principle was socialist internation-
alism. Following the revolts in Poland and Hungary in 1956, efforts 
to reform the socialist system resulted in encouragement of cooperation 
among national Communist parties. Institutions creating legal ties 
between the socialist governments were formed. Despite these develop-
ments, relations with the socialist countries continued to present 
i :. ,· ·''' ' 
the Soviet government with a most serious problem. The rift with 
Yugoslavia and the Sino-Soviet split contributed to Khrushchev's 
downfall in 1964.15 
Post-Khrushchev 
There is little need for prolonged discussion here since the 
subsequent chapters are a more thorough examination of trends of the 
14Ibid., PP• 12-1). 
15Grzybowski, The Socialist Commonwealth, pp. 251-55· 
15 
Khrushchev regime and the following years. In general, the Brezhnev-
Kosygin leadership has been rational and bureaucratic, more so than 
the Khrushchev~ Regarding international relations, the Soviet 
Union has strong interests in conserving the status quo. As we shall 
see, the Soviet Union;~or the most part accepts international law, 
although it may disagree with other nations on interpretations. The 
most important source of international law, according to the Soviets, 
is the treaty, discussed in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER III 
THE TREATY IN SOVIET INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In the Soviet Union, the treaty is regarded as being of 
primary importance for international law. Where new law between 
nations is called for, the favorite Soviet instrument is the treaty. 
It has been noted that Soviet theories and practice do not coincide 
at times. This is so in the Soviet positions regarding treaties. To 
maintain a balanced view, one must recognize the relationship between 
the two. 
Throughout its history, the Soviet Union has repeatedly 
stressed that international relations must be based on negotiations 
between sovereign and equal states. Such a relationship may be cor-
rectly expressed in a treaty. The sovereign state is not obligated to 
accept and obey laws in the ~Aking of which the state did not partici-
pate and to which it did not agree. A positivistic interpretation of 
law is given, stressing law as something made by the parties involved. 
The Soviets traditionally have rejected the idea of ~atural law as 
something inherent in the nature of the universe. That view is unscien-
tific according to ¥ar.xist principles that explain that law is a product 
of society's economic basis. Customary law is frowned upon. 
16 
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The supremacy of the treaty as a source of international law 
is characteristic of most states. The Soviets, however, place consid-
erably more value in positivist law than many others whose culture 
teaches the concept of natural law. Comparing the Soviet Union and 
the United States on this point, Harold J. Berman states: 
In Soviet theory, states are bound by that to which they 
have consented by treaty, with custom playing a very subsidiary 
role. The United States, on the other hand, has placed greater 
emphasis on customary international law and at the same time 
has emphasized the existence of universally accepted principles 
of fairness and justice independent of treaties. 
Jus Cogens 
The Soviet view of the basic position of formal agreements is 
shown by the attitude toward the principle of jus cogens. The debate 
on jus cogens in recent years during the consideration of the Law of 
Treaties by the International Law Commission questioned the arbitrary 
"sovereignty'' of the treaty in international law. Jus cogens is 
defined as those rules "fundamental to the present international 
system" which "limit the freedom of the states in determining their 
mutual rights and obligations •" In other words, jus:.cogens are rights 
states cannot derogate by agreement in treaties.2 One Soviet jurist 
writing on the question reveals the Soviet concern for the essential 
characteristic of agreement among states. 
1Harold J. Berman, "Law as an Instrument of Peace in U.S.-Soviet 
Relations," Stanford Law Review, XXII (1971), P• 950. 
2Grzybowski, Soviet Public International Law, pp. 61-62. 
18 
International law is a specific branch of law. Its norms 
are established on the basis of agreements between states which 
are both the "legislators" and "executives" and "defenders of 
norms established," ••• But this specificity does not in the 
slightest degree deny to international law, including such a 
vital component as norms of jus cogens, a quality of legal 
superstructure ,3 
Thus norms of international law, .ius cogens included, are the products 
of agreements between states, even when not formal agreements. 
----------., 
.Aiexidze; goes on to say: 
However, the norms of jus cogens can be changed only given 
the approval of all or almost all states, for they are a basis 
of international law and order established by the states. 
Some of these norms named by the Soviets are the sovereign rights of 
states and peoples, defense of peace and security, pacta sunt servanda 
("the treaty must be observed"), rights of human beings to dignity 
and freedom, and prohibition of crimes against humanity.4 Thus it 
may be argued that the Soviet jurists have accepted some limitations 
on the treaty, especially on the content of treaties. 
Characteristics of the Treaty 
The Soviet Union has well-developed theories regarding the 
nature and characteristics of the treaty. It is defined as an inter-
national agreement among states creating rights and obligations in 
international lavT. Usually, but not always, the treaty is in written 
form. On~ sovereign states have the authority to conclude treaties, 
3L, A. Alexidze, "Problem of Jus Cogens in Contemporary 
International Law," Soviet Yearbook of International Law 1 6 
(Moscow: Publishing House Nauka, 1970 , P• 147. 
4~., p. 147. 
19 
although sometimes national groups fighting for their independence 
are so classified by the Soviet Union. The subject matter of the 
treaty must be capable of realization, administrable under interna-
tional law, and not outside the authority of those states (i.e., 
limited qy the principle of jus cogens).5 
According to the Soviet Constitution, the various Union 
Republics of the Soviet Union have the right to make international 
agreements, although no such-specific provisions were set down. In 
practice, the individual Republics have never exercised this right, 
and treaties are negotiated by the leaders of the U.s.s.R. and its 
Ll"'~-~ 
Presidium. ·The requirement of ratification is an indication of the 
modifying effects of world opinion and events on Soviet policies. 
According to Leninist ideology, the Soviet Union carries out the will 
of the people as expressed through the Party. Under the principle of 
democratic centralism, there is no internal disagreement, and there is 
but one will to be carried out. In order to enhance Soviet prestige 
and to reciprocate the ratification by parliamentary organizations in 
other states, the Soviet Union found it worthwhile to formalize 
treaties by the constitutive act of ratification.6 
Some aspects of Soviet treaty policy indicate the frank sub-
servience of international law to the interests of foreign policy. 
5Triska and Finley, pp. 401-402. 
6!!?M., PP• 403-405. 
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An example is the Soviet views on reservations to treaties. Reserva-
tions are formal declarations ~ signatory states declaring the 
intention to exclude some provision of the treaty or to change its 
meaning. The use of reservations has arisen with the increase in the 
number of multilateral agreements concluded. The Soviet Union regis-
tered reservations to the Genocide Convention in 1948, successfully 
defending in the United Nations its right to do so in 1950. The most 
significant Soviet reservation is the refusal to agree to compulsory 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Despite the 
obvious convenience of such an instrun~nt as reservation, the Soviet 
position is based on political reality rather than ideology. The 
heterogeneity of governments, culture, and ideology makes the 
practice of reservations almost a necessity in this age of multilateral 
contracts.? The United States, it should be noted, also made a 
reservation against compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. 
A study of Soviet theories .concerning the interpretation of 
treaties presents further evidence on how the Soviets work to protect 
their interests. The bulk of the power of interpretation is possessed 
by the contracting states. This rr~y or may not be provided for in 
the treaty itself. In some cases, other bodies of interpretations 
may be the ICJ, an international organization (such as the UN 
Security Council), arbitration or conciliation corrilldssions, or diplo-
rr~tic missions. The contracting parties, however, rraintain the right 
?Ibid., PP• 406-408. 
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to decide whether to submit a case and to whom it will be submitted 
for judgment, unless such provisions were agreed upon in the treaty. 
Although such theories are designed to protect Soviet interests, it 
is mistaken to view them as biased attitudes common only to Communists. 
}~st nations act on the same policies for their protection.8 
A few other comments regarding Soviet doctrine on treaties 
are appropriate. The methods of lawful termination of agreements 
accepted by the Soviet Union are those recognized by the international 
system in general. Violation by one party is just grounds for the 
termination of the treaty by other parties. The Soviet Union also 
advocates progressive revision of treaties to correspond to changing 
international conditions and claims the right to judge the legality of 
treaties by Soviet standards. The question of rebus sic stantibus 
(justification for violating a treaty because of a changed situation) 
has been a sticky issue. Soviet jurists have alternated between 
insistence that treaties be kept and endorsement of necessary exception 
to the rules. Western legal scholars have shared this vacillation.9 
Lenin, in the Decree on Peace in 1917, renounced secret diplo-
macy and subsequently made public the texts of over one hundred secret 
treaties made by the tsarist regime. Although the Soviets have not 
changed their ideological stance, the practice of the Soviet government 
has been otherwise. The existence of secret agreements made before and 
8Ibid., PP• 410-411. 
9Ibid., pp. ~11-414. 
- -
22 
during World War II is proven, and the evidence strongly suggests 
several have been made since 1945. Defense of this practice by Soviet 
authorities consists of a hazy differentiation between evil secret 
diplomacy and necessary state secrets. Only the latter, of course, 
is permissible and done by the Soviet leaders.1° 
Soviet Treaties in Practice 
¥~ny American observers of the U.S.S.R. have been skeptical 
of Soviet promises. They see the situation unchanged since Lenin's 
famous "pie crust" statement. lawrence W. Beilenson expresses such a 
view in his book, The Treaty Trap. Despite his stated intent to study 
the question without bias to Communism, Beilenson finds sinister 
motivations behind every Soviet action, His study is restricted to 
treaties of predominantly political content, which is partly respon-
sible for his negative, one-sided viewpoint,11 A much more satis-
factory treatment is Triska and Finley's quantitative analysis of 
Soviet treaties.12 
The roost striking fact shown in the analysis is the Soviet 
preference for the bilateral treaty. In the period 1958-62, 965 of a 
l-;~g:~·\ '< 
total of 1058 international agreements were bilateral, a ratio of over 
1\ 
1~., pp. 415-418. 
11tawrence W, Beilenson, The Treaty Trap (Washington, D.C.: 
Public Affairs Press, 1969), PP• 161-191. 
12Triska and Finley, pp. 422-427. 
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ten bilateral to one multilateral agreement. Treaties were negotiated 
with 62 states, although close to 90 percent of the treaties were 
concluded with 36 of these states. Of these, 43.7 per cent were n~de 
with other Communist nations, 27.6 per cent with developing countries, 
and only 7.1 per cent with Western nations.13 Beilenson was not con-
cerned with treaties other than those concluded with the West. 
Although they are undoubtedly i~portant to the United States, they still 
present only a small portion of Soviet treaties. 
Content analysis of the treaties reveals the fallacy of empha-
sizing only political treaties. The most common type of treaty was 
that dealing with trade and commerce. The number of agree~ents of 
predominantly political conflict have sharply declined in comparison 
with the number negotiated before 1958. A large number of treaties 
deal with mostly technical questions with which there is a minimum of 
political disagreement. 
In non-political, economic and technical treaties incidents 
of Soviet violation are infrequent and then are due to political 
causes. Primarily Soviet violations are against political treaties 
(alliances, treaties of mutual assistance, non-~ession, neutrality, 
etc.). Although, as we can see, the treaty as a method of interna-
tional cooperation is not limited to political questions, political 
treaties are most likely to be violated. Political treaties generally 
13Ibid. 
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concern matters which states consider very important to their national 
interests. Of course, violations of such agreements receive a great 
deal more attention than the keeping of a hundred non-political 
treaties, The record of the Soviet Union, even for political treaties, 
does not show significant~ higher na~bers of violation than the 
records of other world powers, 14 Furthermore, even Beilenson noted 
that the United States, as well as the Soviet Union often violated 
political treaty commit~ents. 
Trends Present and Future 
An excerpt from Soviet Foreign Policy by Triska and Finley 
sums up the role of treaties in Soviet policies, 
Through international treaties, Soviet Russia defined, 
maintained, and developed its independence and secured status 
as well as recognition of its "special" • • , structure in the 
world •••• They lireatie~7 helped to make Soviet Russia, 
originally an outcast, gradually acceptable and accepted in 
the world; in the process, they per11itted the U.S.S.R. to 
introduce, press for, and at times successfully defend radical 
innovations in international relations, At the same time, 
however, international treaties assisted other nations in 
curbing many excesses on the part of the U.S.S.R., either 
directly by their contents or through the understanding that 
there would be no treaty unless certain conditions of comity 
and reciprocity were met by the Soviet Union.15 
What are the trends in the role of the treaty now and what 
trends can be projected for the future? Treaties will certainly con-
tinue to be one of the most widely-used forms of international law, 
although informal agreements may become more popular, As a method of 
solving major political disputes, too much should not be expected of 
14Ibi<L' p. 421-423. 
15Ibid,, p. 393. 
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treaties, Treaties are quite valuable in reducing tensions and in 
eliminating possible areas of conflict in the future. Examples of 
treaties with preventative intent are the sea-bed treaty, the treaty 
for peaceful uses of outer space, and the limited test-ban treaty. 
On the other hand, there has been little success in the half-hearted 
attempts at arms limitation and disarmament. The Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks, begun in late 1969 have produced no treaties and 
neither side is very anxious to come to an agreement,16 It would be 
surprising if the two nations decided on major arms reductions, 
The number of treaties of a functional, technical nature will 
probably continue to grow, Although not spectacular, they perform 
very real services by keeping the machinery of co~~unication and co-
operation running smoothly. As the parts of the v10rld system grow 
more interdependent, the regulation of an increasing volume of inter-
national contacts will be needed between the Soviet Union and other 
nations, 
In general, Soviet treaty theory and practice are quite 
similar to that of other nations. The Soviet Union finds it bene-
ficial to participate in and to obey treaties. Like all nations, 
the Soviet Union in so doing tries to maintain and to increase its 
influence. There are no indications of any radical shifts in the 
near future, 
16Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Approaches to SALT" Problems of 
Communism, XIX (Sept.-Oct. 1970), PP• 1-10, 
CHAPTER IV 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SOVIET LAV.l 
The twentieth century has witnessed the development of rr~ny 
international organizations. These organizations, established by 
treaties, have grown in pm·1er to the extent that in some instances they 
are considered subjects of international law, enjoying rights of a 
sovereign body. The Soviet Union, of course, has been affected by 
the rise of international organizations and has tried to exert its 
o~m influence on the course of their development. The topic of Soviet 
relations with international organizations covers a vast number of 
transactions. This discussion is mainly concerned with Soviet 
policies regarding the legal powers and limitations of international 
organizations. 
The Soviet Perspective 
'J 
r.·-.. : "-( 
Early intits,history, the Soviet Union rejected the League 
~~ . . ( r;: ~~ .··. ,~, 
of Nations, dismissing it as an imperialist 11 club'~\to maintain the 
status quo. The Soviet attitude was based on the memory of interven-
tion during the Civil War by France and Great Britain--the most 
influential members of the League. This early view of international 
organizations has continued to color Soviet opinion, partially 
explaining their negative stance toward cooperative efforts. Gradually, 
/ ... ~·-
•-;:-. /1 . '··. 
·) , 'having_.found it useful to participate in international organizations, 
. "~~~-(~ 
n 
lj 
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the Soviet Union policy has shifted. One major factor in the shift 
was a desire to influence the forwAtion of post-World War II inter-
national law. 
Ideological, as well as historical, reasons have limited the 
Soviet perspective. As we discussed in the previous chapter, time 
after time the Soviet Union has stressed the importance of state 
sovereignty. This is especially the case in dealing with international 
organizations. The Soviets are most reluctant to concede any sort of 
autonomy to bodies other than states. The main target of this policy 
is the United Nations Organization (the UN). Furthermore, the Soviet 
Union, priding itself on its monolithic nature, distrusts the claims 
of cooperation from a loose organization of such diverse member 
nations.1 Despite some modification, the Soviets continue to view 
world relations in terms of a struggle between the capitalist and 
socialist syste~~. The UN cannot unite the two systems. The Soviet 
leaders continue to reject the idea of lasting neutrality.2 
In some respects, the Soviet attitude toward the UN is a 
product of political realism. Going beyond mere negativism, the 
Soviet approach recognized the fact of the pluralistic nature of the 
world community. Accordingly, Soviet goals in the UN have been quite 
1Richard N. Gardner, "The Soviet Union and the United Nations," 
law and Con temporary Problems , XXIX (Autumn 1964) , pp. 845-84-6. 
2Alexander Dallin, "The Soviet View of the United Nations," 
from Le al and Political Problems of World Order, edited by Saul H. 
·l".!Sncfiovitz. New York: Fund for Education Concerning World Peace 
Through World law, 1962), pp.500-502. 
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limited compared to the sometimes overly optimistic hopes of the 
United States. In fact, this attitude was quite realistic in the 
early years at the UN when the United States enjoyed a ttmechanical 
majority' and the Soviet Union had only the support of its Eastern 
European satellites. The Soviet Union, as usual, was frank in its 
use of the organization to accomplish Soviet goals. The admission 
of the new developing states to the UN changed the early alignments 
and with it, the character of the UN. Although the increased 
diversity of opinions has made united action more difficult, the 
movement also resulted in a slight loosening of Soviet attitudes. 
A Shift in Attitude 
The Soviet Union, becoming more sophisticated in international 
diplomacy, now sees more advantages in participation at the UN than 
it did before. Soviet diplomats have found.the UN useful:in attempts 
to appeal to the new developing nations. The UN also provides a 
rostrum from which it can reach a world-wide audience. However, the 
u.s.s.R.does not see the UN as an active force in initiating world 
law. That is the prerogative of nation-states. 
The UN Charter and Resolutions 
The Soviet Union insists on a strict, narrow interpretation 
of the powers of the United Nations. The UN Charter, say the Soviets, 
is a treaty, an international law which the men1bers are bound to obey. 
Nevertheless, this treaty must be limited to its original purposes. 
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The Soviets strongly deny that the Charter is the constitution of a 
new system of world government. The u.s.S.R has resisted efforts to 
enlarge the functions and authority of the UN, such as those of Dag 
Hammarskjold during his tenure as Secretary-General,3 
Those who hope for a strong world government in the future 
sometimes see the UN General Assembly as the prototype of the legis-
lative body of that supergovernment. Soviet jurists submit that the 
role of world legislature does not belong to the General Assembly. 
Soviet international jurists, however, do not agree among themselves 
on the legal force of General Assembly resolutions. Some scholars 
state that resolutions in conformity with the Charter ~ a source of 
international law binding member nations. Others w~intain that reso-
lutions ~ not a source of law and that they are binding only in 
organizational or technical questions. In between the two extremes 
are a variety of more moderate viewpoints, some of which set up con-
ditions where resolutions are binding. For example, one school of 
thought advocates recognition of resolutions as a source of law when 
adopted by a two-thirds vote, Others gave their approval to resolutions 
adopted unanimously. A more complicated approach calls for acceptance 
by a majority of states from both socio-economic systems, (socialist 
and capitalist), and by members of all three ~~jor blocs. At any 
3Edward 1-'.icWhinney, "The Rule of Law and the Peaceful Settlement 
of Disputes," in Soviet and American Policies in the United Nations, 
edited by Alvin Z. Rubinstein and George Gins burgs (New York: New York 
University Press, 1971), PP• 169-170. 
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rate, many Soviet scholars accept UN resolutions as a stage in the 
process of law-maKing,4 
Despite the views of their jurists, Soviet practice in the 
UN has been to continue to deny the General Assembly any substantial 
law-maKing authority. This position was expedient in the days when 
the Soviet Union almost always found itself in the minority. It it 
interesting that the Soviet position has not changed, despite the 
disappearance of an automatic pro~iestern majority upon the entrance 
of the new nations, often dubbed the "Third World." Conceivably, 
the Soviet Union might have attempted to consolidate an anti-colonial 
coalition of socialist and Third World nations, but it has resisted 
any temptations to do so, Besides being reluctant to damage their 
credibility in an about-face, the Soviet Union shows caution in its 
UN diplomacy,5 
The Security Council and Peacekeeping 
In the Soviet view, the Security Council is politically and 
lega~ the primary organ of the United Nations. According to the 
Charter, the Security Council was vested with the peace-keeping 
authority. The veto right of the five original permanent members was 
partly a concession to the Soviet preference for unanimity. Further-
more, the Soviet government believed this an essential condition for 
~1. V. Yanovsky, "Soviet Science on the U,gal Force of U.N. 
General Assembly Resolutions," Soviet Yearbook of International Law, 
1964-65, (:Noscow: Publishing House Nalli<a, 1966), pp. 121-122. 
5.tvrcWhinney, 11 The Rule of law. • • , " p. 170. 
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the safe-guarding of socialist interests. The Western states generally 
agreed, feeling a similar need for preserving their interests. The 
veto was a realistic measure for all, since the UN was not capable of 
enforcing action against a superpower. The frequent Soviet exercise 
of the veto (103 times by 196.5) prevented the "proper" functioning of 
the Security Council, according to the pro-West majority. The result 
was the General Assembly Uniting for Peace Resolution in 19.50 and the 
transfer of much of peace-keeping activity to the General Assembly. 
The Soviets saw this as a violation of the UN Charter.6 
Peace-keeping activities themselves, especial~ those taken by 
General Assembly action, have raised controversies over questions of 
legal interpretation. As a rule, the Soviet Union has opposed such 
questions only when they are perceived as against the direct interests 
of the U.s.s.R. The U.s.s.R. continues to insist on the voluntary 
nature of peace-keeping, especially the financial costs. In the early 
sixties, a crisis developed over assessments for peacekeeping costs 
... ~ .. ~- .. ---. ..... ,u........., 
and .. o:Ai-ticle 19')of the Charter, reaching a head in 196.5. The U.S.S.R. 
-\,~~w_..._,~.-~-,·~·•.,.-••~'"'"'"''<,j> 
with its position of opposition to collective responsibility won out 
when the U.S. backed down to avoid disastrous confrontations,? 
International Court of Justice 
We have already referred to the Soviet policy regarding the 
International Court of Justice in the discussion of treaty law. 
6John G, Stoessinger, The United Nations and Superpowers, 
(New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 3-19. 
?raui,, PP• 90-113. 
With few qualifications, the Soviets are extremely hostile toward 
judicial settlement of international legal questions. The U.s.s.R. 
has steadfastly resisted attempts to make submission of disputes to 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) compulsory. In the struggle 
between socialism and capitalism there can be no impartial bodies. 
It is also important that, as in the General Assembly, the Soviets 
faced a largely pro-Western court in the ICJ,8 But the Soviet Union 
is not the only state refusing to accept compulsory jurisdiction. 
Despite its idealistic analogies of the ICJ to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
the U.S, in the Connelly Amendment repudiated the compulsory "power" 
of the ICJ. The United States is not willing to submit major po-
litical questions to the World Courtp, but only issues of secondary 
importance. The actions of both the Soviet Union and the United 
States are, after all, an indication of the very real fact that there 
are many political disputes not amenable to solution by legal formulas.9 
Other Organizations 
Some mention should be made of Soviet legal attitudes toward 
the economic and social functions of international organizations. ~any 
of the bodies dealing with such functions are associated with the 
hP\v·u 
United Nations. The Soviets held a restrictive view of the legality 
of these organizations. International economic and social cooperation 
Bzigurds Zile, "A Soviet Contribution and International 
Adjudication." American Journal of International Law, LVIII 
(April 1964) PP• 364-366. 
9McWhinney, "The Rule of Law. • n . , PP• 171-178 • 
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no doubt have see~ed incongruous to the Soviets in light of their 
concept of a world-wide struggle between two major socio-economic 
systems. 
Politically, Soviet leaders wished to maintain maximum free-
dom of action. The Soviet Union did not join the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreements on Trade and 
Tariffs. For many years, it was not a member of the subsidiaries of 
the UN (UNESCO, ILO, and WHO). The Soviet contributions to EPTA 
and to the Special Fund of the UN in 1964 were only 4 per cent of 
total contributions, although Soviet contributions composed 17 per 
cent of the regular budget. Yet gradually, the Soviet Union has come 
to participate more in international organization activities. The 
Soviet desire to favorably influence the newer nations makes necessary 
greater involvement and more sophisticated, less heavy-handed tech-
niques. Therefore, Soviet theories are moving toward a more con-
ciliatory view of social and econo~c functions in response to this 
need.10 
The Soviet Union remains hostile to the development of any 
powerful international organization that would restrict or infringe 
upon the sovereignty of the Soviet state. Naturally, any organization 
whose goals and functions are not in accord with Soviet interests are 
not favorably regarded by the Soviet leaders. To an increasing extent, 
however, the Soviets have found international organizations and 
10 s ·a-Gardner, pp. 50- 53· 
cooperation, although limited, to be a fact of life in international 
relations. l1ore and more, it is to the Soviet advantage to work 
through international organizations, especial~ because of the wish 
to gain the cooperation of the "Third World," The Soviets have 
recently called for "streamlining the regulation of relations between 
states and international organizations. Although the international 
organization does not possess the legal personality of a state, it is 
now recognized as a "derivative and special subject of international 
law," The Soviet Union, due to its increasing interests in inter-
national organization is likely to develop legal theories in accordance 
with its interests, helping to create the streamlining that it desires. 
11r, I. Lu.'lcashuk, 11Some Problems of Codification and Progressive 
Development of International Treaties Law, Soviet Yearbook of 
International Law, 1966-67 (Moscow: Publishing House NaQka, 1968) 
P• 70. 
CHAPTER V 
THE SOVlET UNION AND CUSTON.ARY LAW 
The attitude of Soviet international jurists on customary law 
has traditionally been even more negative than their attitude toward 
international organizations. Customary law itself is somewhat amor-
phous, being defined as principles that are generally accepted although 
not written down as forrr.al law. The concept may be extended to norms 
or patterns of behaviour in relations between states. 'rhe reasons for 
Soviet opposition were both ideological and political. Like the atti-
tude toward international organizations, views on customary law have 
shifted in recent years. We will now examine some reasons for the 
Soviet attitudes and hovr they have changed. 
Resistance and Customary Law 
There is a strong ideological basis for opposition to cus-
tomary law in· Communism. We briefly alluded to this in the discussion 
of treaties. 1 Customary law can easily, though not necessarily, be 
tied to the idea of natural law, which the Soviets reject as unscien-
tific. The emphasis on positive law conflicts with customs that do 
not reflect specific or bound agreements concluded between sovereign 
-----~ ..... \ 
states. Moreover customary law was not adaptable to the Na.rxist thesis ·\ 
i 
of law as a product of the material basis of society. 
1see Chap. iii, p. 16. 
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In some respects, customary law may be said to be a product 
of society. In the first years of the Soviet regime, the customary 
laws of the international system were mainly the results of the 
interests of capitalist European states during the past centuries. 
The Soviet leaders, isolated and defensive, savr little help from 
custom which they feared might be used against them. Thus, the Soviet 
rejection of customary law formed. It is with the rise of the Soviet 
Union as a world pov7er that io7e see a change of attitude. 
Development of New Custorr~ 
As has been noted before, the theory and practice of Soviet 
international law often differ significantly. Flexibility and prag-
~Atism are evident in Soviet policy. Therefore, it should not be 
surprising that as the Soviet Union developed as a 'iJOrld power, norms 
of behaviour established themselves. The increasing influence of the 
U.s.s.R. and increasing nunmer of international contacts, especially 
with the United States, gradually led to new "ground rules." These 
vrere unwritten "laws" that guide the actions of the superpowers in 
the post-World War II world. The rules, of course, must be flexible, 
conforming to the changing balances of po-vrer.2 
During the early years of the Cold War, the ground rules, or 
customary laws, were either lacking or deficient. The numerous 
2Edward l'icWhinney, "Soviet and Western International law and 
the Cold War in the Era of Bipolarity," International Law, Vol. II 
of The Strategy of World Order, ed. by Richard A. li'alk (J vols.; 
New York: World law Fund, 1966), P• 190. 
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confrontations of crisis proportions, constantly testing the commit-
ments of the "Big Two," more than once threatened to escalate into 
war. Often the issues, not vitally important in themselves, became 
symbols of struggle for prestige to be won or lost. The instability 
and maneuvering for position were signs of the lack of customary 
lav1 established for the new and rapidly shifting international situa-
tion that followed World War II. Some significance w~y be attached 
to the fact that also during the fifties, the Soviet Union sponsored 
their drive to establish their principle of peaceful coexistence as a 
principle of international law. The Soviets, feeling the increase in 
their power, tried to have the UN codify peaceful coexistence as a 
formal law into which they could inject their own interpretations. 
The vagueness and irrelevance of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence 
on an informal "working" basis disqualifies it as customary law. The 
Soviet regime under Khrushchev tried to use it, in effect, as custom-
ary law at times, implying the acceptance of that principle as an 
international norm. These attempts were usually follo-v1ed by charges 
that the United States had violated that principle. In these cases, 
the Soviets asserted their ideological and political position to in-
fluence the formation of international law.3 
In the sixties, relations between the United States and the 
Soviet Union became such that many students of international affairs 
saw the beginning of detente. The turning point was the Cuban missile 
Jibid., P• 191 
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crisis in 1962, which concluded with Khrushchev's backing down. 
Shortly afterwards came the signing of the partial test-ban treaty 
and the establishment of the "hot-line" between Washington and hoscow. 
Soviet pressure for the codification of East-West legal relations in 
the form of peaceful coexistence declined. The Soviet government 
began to see more advantages in the upholding of international law. 
The status quo orientation at this period is attributed by ~~Whinney 
to the Soviet ninvestment in reasonable stability of settled expecta-
tions."4 
The trend in the U.s.s.R. was concurrent with a modification 
of attitudes by the United States. The U.S. foreign policy-~~kers 
came to the realization that the articulation of traditional customary 
law favored by Americans often failed to win the desired objectives. 
For instance, the U.S. began to accept the fact that the UN was often 
not a suitable arena for negotiation and settlement of serious con-
flicts. The United States and the Soviet Union strove to establish 
more viable methods of peace-keeping.5 
The "Rules of the Game" 
The result of these movements was the informal establishment 
of unwritten "rules of the game," guiding relations between the u.s. 
and the U.S.S.R. in the mid and late sixties. The emphasis was placed 
4:Edward 1-fcWhinney, "Changing International law Nethod and 
Objectives in the Era of Soviet-Western Detente, 11 American Journal of 
International Law, LIX (1965), P• 6 • 
.5Edward HcWhinney, 11 The Rule of law and the Peaceful Settlement 
of Disputes, in Soviet and A.'Tlerican Policies in the United Nations, 
ed. by Alvin z. Rubinstein and George Ginsburgs, (New York: New York 
University Press, 1971), PP• 165-83. 
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on less formal and less publicized methods. The underJ¥ing theme of 
these norms, or patterns of behaviour, was reciprocal deference. The 
two superpowers mutual~ recognized the existence of spheres of influ-
ence and of areas of sensitivity. Avoiding sudden moves and surprise 
was practiced to prevent escalation of disputes due to mistaken inter-
pretations of intentions. In confrontations, the superpowers were to 
exercise econo~ in the use of power. That is, on~ coercion that is 
absolutely necessary should be used. The measures taken should be 
appropriate to the issues at stake. 
Another promising feature of this period was the practice 
labelled as the "politics of mutua 1 example , " ref erring to a unila. tera 1 
initiative to decrease tensions, in hope that the other side will 
reciprocate. Examples of ways this can be effected are troop reduc-
tions and cut-backs in defense budgets. This entire approach is based 
on consensual rules regarding low-level issues. Such rules were not 
intended to solve the basic ideological conflict, but to lessen ten-
sion so as to reduce the possibility of war.6 
Norms in the Changing World Structure 
The norms just discussed describe the behaviour of the major 
powers in an essentially bipolar world. Even in the sixties, however, 
this structural feature was changing. The Sino-Soviet split and 
Yugoslavia's independent road to socialism were signs of the increasing 
6McWhinney, "Changing International Law ¥.1ethod and Objectives •" 
P• 7-14. 
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polycentrism of international communism. In the following years, 
China became a recognized world power. As the world's most populous 
nation and a nuclear power, its influence on the U.S.-Soviet norms 
grew. The Chinese, claiming to foster the spirit of communist 
I . ' V!.<!Ulc..t d- {~-' 
revolution, denounce the revisionism of ~oscow and appeal to the 
revolutionary elements in Asian countries. The power of China, 
challenging the power of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., has added 
another dimension to international relations and has upset the bal-
ance of customary relations established in the sixties.? 
Another factor changing the bipolar structure is the failure 
of either the U.s. or the U.S.S.R. to win dominant influence over a 
significant portion of the Third World. The ideological struggle for 
influence with these nations has wound down considerably. The leaders 
of the Third World have been less politically lnaieve-)than the devel-
·~ ... _________ .. --
oped nations formerly believed. Not only have they maintained their 
independence, often playing the Americans and the Soviets against each 
other, but they also have demanded that international law be revised 
to reflect their interests more clear~y. Besides the result of these 
trends in current customary law, the revolutionary tendencies in the 
developing nations have the potential of sudden eruptions that could 
drastical~ affect the international situation.8 
7Bans Norgenthau, "Changes and Chances in American-Soviet 
Relations," Foreign Affairs, XLIX (April1971), no. ), pp. 4JJ-J4. 
8~., pp. 4J1-J2, 440. 
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Adding to these trends the rise of Japan to a position of 
major economic importance, the radical changes in the world balance 
of power since the mid-sixties are apparent. Obviously, the norms 
formerly appropriate are so no longer. The situation of the seventies 
is much ~ore complex, and many more variables must be considered. At 
the present time, it is difficult to distinguish what mutual~ accept-
able norms have been formulated in the new system. The powers are 
still testing each other out, and the situation is by no means stable. 
In time, however, it is expected that new rules of interaction will 
be established. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE SOVIET UNION A.l.\fD THE THIRD WORlD 
At several times during the preceding discussion, the "Third 
World" has been mentioned. These new developing nations--mainly of 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America--have presented special problems to 
the Soviet Union. Allied with neither the "imperialist" camp or the 
socialists, the majority of these states do not easi~ fit into the 
communist conception of clear-cut struggle between capitalism and 
socialism. Soviet legal theories regarding them have continually 
been adjusted and re-adjusted to bring theory more nearly in line with 
Soviet interests. We have already seen some of the effects of Third 
World politics on other areas of international law. This chapter 
will examine Soviet international law towards the nations themselves 
in this group. 
The Development of the Policies 
For the most part, the developing nations were colonies of 
the major European powers when the Soviet Union came into existence. 
The earliest Soviet position regarding national and colonial questions 
was tal-::en in Lenin's statement at the Second Comintern Congress in 
1920. It was the duty of the Communist Party to assist and ally with 
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those countries undergoing bourgeois democratic revolutions. In the 
colonial areas, the revolution of the middle class was a progressive 
element and a necessary step to>vard socialism. Perhaps more important 
was the obligation to instill in the working class a class conscious-
ness leading to a proletarian socialist revolution.1 
In the period between the two World Wars, the Soviet Union~~ 
ideological stance was to encourage revolution in the .b'&"' colonies_,.:!.-sup-
porting nationalist forces fighting for independence. It is interest-
ing to note, however, that the support of such independence movements 
was a policy of Imperial Russia before the existence of Soviet Russia. 
This is not too surprising when one considers that this policy was 
intended to weaken Russia's opponents by the loss of their colonies.2 
It would be difficult to believe that this motivation did not occur 
to Soviet leaders. Of course, the Soviet position could be defended 
ideologically by its opposition to imperialism. Despite the Soviet 
advocation of self-determination (a popular idea also supported by 
Woodrow Wilson), the Soviet Union remained, in a sense, a colonial 
power herself. Denying self-determination to nationalities with her 
boundaries, Soviet Russia brutally suppressed some of these movements 
with military force, especially in Georgia and the Ukraine. 
The Stalinist regime did not follow through, in practice, 
the support of revolutionary movements. Stalin's first concern was 
1Harish Kapur, "A Half-Century of Soviet Foreign Folicy in Asia," in 
The Soviet Union: A Half-Centur of Communism, ad. by Kurt London 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968 , pp. 460-1. 
2Ibid. 
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the defense of the U.S.S.R. and his position as leader. Rebellions 
that would not contribute to Soviet security were discouraged. The 
Comintern, supposedly the headquarters of world revolution, was Stalin's 
instrument to accomplish foreign policy goals. Revolutionary move-
ment~in neighboring Iran and Turkey were cooled off. Local Comnunist 
parties in other countries were restrained by the Comintern. This 
was the case with China, in which the Russians went so far as to sup-
port the nationalist group, the Kuomintang. Consequently, the Com-
munists suffered a drastic defeat that gave them a serious set-back.3 
By the time Khrushchev came to power in 1954, the decoloniza-
tion movement, as well as the Cold War, 1-rere well underway. The new 
nations became targets of Western and Soviet attempts to expand their 
spheres of influence. At the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, 
Khrushchev announced his three-camp theory. During the previous regime, 
Stalin had recognized only two camps--capitalist and socialist. 
Khrushchev, in a rather ~Ajor ideological revision, added the non-
aligned states as a third camp. The early Cold War failures of Soviet 
military power in the West had encouraged Khrushchev to turn to the 
most non-aligned, developing nations. The three-camp theory no doubt 
was intended to impress these nations by "favorable" policies. 4-
3Richard J. Barnet, Intervention and Revolution (Cleveland, 
Ohio: World Publishing Company, 1968) pp. 62-64-. 
4Triska and Finley, PP• 249-251. 
Wars of National Liberation 
The Soviets also incorporated the concept of "wars of national 
liberation" into their theories of. international law. The normal 
meaning of the phrase referred to the liberation of colonies and depen-
dent countries from the "yoke of imperialism." Traditionally, nations 
had considered colonial wars as domestic struggles not in the domain 
of international law. The Soviets, however, insisted that they were 
international wars. In a rare expansion of international law, the 
Soviets asserted the juridical equality not on~ of colonial depend-
encies, but also of national movements that have not yet established 
any form of state government. The Soviet Union claimed for them the 
right of national sovereignty,5 
According to the Soviet position, although to the colonial 
nations belonged at least some of the rights of a state under inter-
national law, these nations were not to be held to the law themselves. 
In a colonial war, no matter who actually began the hostilities, it 
was always the colonial power who was the aggressor, since he was 
L~perialistic. The Soviet Union cited the UN Charter to justify its 
theories through the "equal rights of self-determination" clause. 
Interpreting it to suit their purposes, the Soviet jurists equated 
self-determination with immediate self-government. They insisted 
that independence be granted to the remaining colonies at maximum speed. 
5George Ginsburgs, " 'Wars of National Liberation' and the 
Hodern Law of Nations--The Soviet Thesis," Law and Contemporary 
Problems, XXIX (Aut~~ 1964), no. J, pp. 910-926. 
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Furthermore, they declared that wars to achieve these ends were just 
wars waged against imperialist aggressors. The nationalist groups 
were free to ignore the laws of warfare because of both their primi-
tive stage of development and their moral rights.6 
Post-Decolonization 
George Gins burgs, when discussing the preceding question in 
1964, concluded with the suggestion that the Soviet Union was then 
"riding the crest" of the wave of anti-imperialism. 
/<:' 
Noting that (2:::!0 
found a ready audience, Ginsburgs questioned what would be the effect 
of that wave's recession.? Since the article was written, Soviet 
attitudes have indeed shifted somewhat. The independence granted to 
almost all the former colonies has removed the opportunity for Soviet 
insistence that@be accomplished. To some extent, @ has been 
replaced to work for the liberation of peoples from neo-colonial 
oppression of economic domination. 
Soviet objectives regarding the Third World are now more 
limited, Under the cautious leadership of Brezhnev and Kosygin, the 
role of international law is played down in Soviet relations with de-
1 . t . 8 ve op1ng coun r1es. This development reflects disillusionment with 
the course of Soviet interests in neutral countries since World War II, 
plus continuing primacy of Soviet national interests over interest in 
6Ibid.' pp. 926-939. 
7Ibid., P• 940. 
8Robert \'lesson, Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective (Homewood, 
Illinois; Dorsey Press, 1969), pp. 341-42. 
47 
communist revolution, Barnet observes that in Algeria, C~us, and 
Egypt, the Soviet Union has not encouraged local co~~unist revolution-
aries, On the contrary, it has tried to gain as an ally the estab-
lished regime, Consequently, the Soviet Union has lost a great deal 
of its appeal to radical elements in many nations, who are turning 
to Red China for support.9 
The Soviet thesis on national liberation, however, is a 
standard feature in virtually every revolutionary platform in devel-
oping nations. The cause itself is no longer championed by the Soviet 
Union as it was in the late fifties and early sixties. Abandonning 
the idea, it is almost impossible to find references to it in recent 
treatises on international law. The Soviet Union for the most part is 
a member of the ranks of the developed countries on this issue. 
9Barnet, p. 68, 
CHAPTER VII 
SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Soviet legal authorities assert that there are significant 
differences between general international law, various aspects of 
which have now been discussed, and law governing relations between 
socialist states. The Communists have long contended that their 
legal theories are more highly developed and more progressive than 
general international law. The reason for this greater advancement 
is the ending of class struggle within the socialist system. Law 
based on the socialist economic system is a product of the just, 
equal relations among the proletariat and of the absence of an 
exploiting class. Until after World War II, of course, the U.s.s.R. 
was the only socialist state and was unable to demonstrate the 
superiority of socialist law. Short],y thereafter, under the tutelage 
of the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czchoslovakia, East Germany, 
Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia established socialist syste~~ in 
their countries. This created the opportunity for the development of 
socialist international law. 
The Theory of Socialist Internationalism 
Proletarian internationalism, the forerunner of current prin-
ciples, called for cooperation with nationalist groups and working 
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class people of all countries, for in Harxism the workers in all lands 
have the same interests. When applied to states with socialist gov-
ernments, this principle was transformed into socialist international-
ism. A Soviet jurist defines socialist internationalism as follows: 
The highest principle in the relations among countries of 
the world socialist syste~ is the principle of socialist inter-
nationalism, which binds each socialist state to cooperation with 
other socialist states in the struggle against imperialism, for 
the victory of socialism and communism. Socialist internation-
alism is proletarian internationalism exten~ed on the field of 
relations among sovereign socialist states. 
What are the secondary principles composing socialist inter-
nationalism7 John N. Hazard has stated that, for the most part, the 
"higher international law" borrows principles of general international 
2 law, 1tfilling old forms with new Socialist context." The most impor-
tant of these principles are the equality of sovereign states, self-
determination of sovereign peoples, non-interference in the internal 
affairs of other states, peaceful coexistence and cooperation, and 
observation of obligations. In addition to these, a statement from 
the current Soviet text on international law adds another rule. "The 
policy of fraternal friendship and disinterested aid is fully reflected 
in the relations between the socialist countries."3 
1E. T. Ussenko,'~nternational Law in the Relations Among 
Socialist States, 11 Soviet Yearbook of International law 1 66-6 
(Hoscow: Publishing House Nauka, 1968 , P• 47. 
2John N. Hazard, "Renewed Emphasis Upon a Socialist International 
Law," American Journal of International law, IXV (January 1971) pp. 142-148. 
3International Law, Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., 
Institute of State and law (Hoscow: Foreign languages Publishing 
House, 1962) P• 20. 
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In reality, the practice of these principles is rr~inly deter-. 
reined by the power and national interests of the Soviet Union. To be 
sure, Soviet interests and the methods usually employed to achieve them 
have undergone changes since the initial establis~~ent of Soviet 
hegemony in Eastern Europe. In the first years of the socialist bloc, 
Stalin saw the socialist states as satellites intended to serve and 
to protect the U.S.S.R. His policies amounted to Russian colonialism, 
almost totally ignoring the needs of individual nations. These coun-
tries, Inilked dry by the Soviets, were soon alienated by Stalin's 
policies. The rebellions in Hungary and Poland in 1956 were caused 
in large part by such discontent. Khrushchev recognized the danger 
and began reforms in the socialist system. Some semblance of political 
autonomy was restored to the satellites. As part of the reform, 
socialist cooperation was incorporated into an organizational frarr~-
4 
v!Ork. 
Socialist International Organizations 
The institutionalization of socialist relations made socialist 
ties into formal law through bilateral and multilateral treaties. 
The multilateral organizations are of chief concern. There are two 
such major organizations. The Warsaw Pact of 1955 is the political 
and military body, established ~ the signing of the Treaty of Friend-
ship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. The initiative for such an 
organization was taken because of the re:militarj_zation of West Germany 
4Triska and Finley, pp. 12-14. 
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and its entrance into the anti-Soviet North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation. The Treaty calls for a unified military corr~nd. A joint 
Political Consultative Committee, with equal representation from each 
sovereign state, is the decision-making organ. In practice, the 
organization, from the beginning, has been almost completely under 
Soviet control. It operates as an instrument of Soviet foreign 
policy.5 
In rrany respects, the Warsaw Fact organization is s~nilar to 
NATO. Each is a system of collective defense. Each owes its exist-
ence to the perception that the other constitutes a threat to security. 
Although not to the same extent, NATO is also controlled by its most 
powerful member, the United States. On the other hand, NATO has not 
used force upon a member state, as has the Warsaw Pact. 
In the economic sphere, socialist relations are organized in 
the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CO~ECON). Formed in 1949, 
this organization became a significant force only after the death of 
Stalin in 1953. The functions of the CO:·JECON are to regulate industry, 
trade, and agriculture in order to rr~intain the highest possible devel-
opment of socialism. Nominally, the CObECON operates on the assump-
tion of the equality of all member states. As in the Warsaw Fact, 
however, the Soviet Union dominates. Not surprisingly, this has usually 
meant that the best interests of the socialist system are found to co-
incide with the best interests of the U.S.S.R.6 
5Andrzej Korbonski, -"The Harsal-1 Pact," International Conciliation, 
no. 573 (l'iay 1969), PP• 5-25. 
6Kazimierz Grzybowski, The Socialist Commonwealth of Nations 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), PP• 263-270. 
The CO~ECON has been compared to the European Economic 
Community, but the differences are certainly great. In Eastern Europe 
virtually all economic activity is government-ovmed and controlled. 
The Common ¥arket sponsors cooperation and some economic integration 
of largely free enterprise economies. Furthermore, in the CoiT~on ~ar-
ket, no one state is powerful enough to dominate the others. The 
EEC is completely voluntary, but the legal organizing of international 
economic activity under COJ:.iECON is an attempt to remove the need for 
coercion by institutionalizing control instead.? 
Several factors have contributed to the relatively easy for-
mation of international legal ties among the socialist states. 
Naturally, it is less difficult to reach agreement when some of the 
factors are homogeneous. The socialist system has much of the needed 
homogeneity. The ideological structure of ¥arxism-Leninism is common 
to all socialist states. Therefore, it is relatively simple to ex-
press their goals in the same language. The legal structures are also 
parallel. The reform movement of the early 1960's resulted in the 
adoption of new constitutions and civil codes modeled after the Soviet 
Union's system. Further~ore, the extreme centralization of govern-
ment facilitates the coordination and control of international social-
ist affairs.8 
?Ibid. 
8 Peter l'Jaggs, 11Unifica tion of La.vr in Eastern Europe," 
American Journal of Comparative Law, Alfi (1968), pp. 107-126. 
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Developments in the Socialist Commonwealth 
The Soviet-initiated international organizations, supposedly 
institutionalizing socialist law, have not been altogether successful. 
As soci~lism has spread and developed, the Soviet Union has become 
less able to control the course of this development. The "equal and 
sovereign states" of the socialist commonwealth have become increas-
ingly dissatisfied with the effects of Soviet domination. Especially 
in the economic sphere, the costs of serving mostly Russian national 
interests have imposed great burdens on the other national economies. 
Demands for greater consideration to individual national economies are 
accompanied by others for an equal voice in policy-ITAking. The Soviet 
Union is finding it increasingly difficult to deal with the side-
effects of over-centralization.9 
Nationalist feelings are on the rise in Eastern Europe. The 
socialist states want to exercise autonomy in fact as well as in 
theory and to determine their own road to socialism. One state--
Yugoslavia--has been successful in reaffirming its sovereignty, having 
broken away from the Eastern Bloc. The Soviet leaders have not been 
able to entice nor to coerce the Yugoslavs to resubmit to Soviet 
domination. Albania, because of its minimal importance to the Soviet 
Union, also was able to resist the domination of ~~scov1. Tne most 
spectacular of dissentions in the socialist world is the Sino-Soviet 
split, a rift between the two most powerful socialist states. This 
9Korbonski, P• 56. 
break has severe~ darr~ged Soviet claims to a unified socialist 
system as described in socialist international law. 10 
The other socialist states--neither powerful enough to enforce 
their autonomy nor insignificant enough for the benefits of coercion 
to outweigh costs--have been forced to deal with their problems using 
international law on Soviet ter~s. In 1968, the issue reached crisis 
proportions in Czechoslovakia, The events there and the forreulation 
of the Brezhnev Doctrine determined a reference point for developments 
since. Because of its importance, the Czechoslovakian invasion and 
the Brezhnev Doctrine will be discussed at some length in the next 
chapter, 
10Ibid., P• 56. 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE 
The socialist states, as we have seen, are committed to 
uphold the principles of voluntary association, equality, territorial 
integrity, and noninterference in the internal affairs of fellow 
socialist states. Yet, on August 20, 1968, Soviet troops, along with 
those of other Warsaw Pact countries, invaded Czechoslovakia. Sev-
eral months later the Czechoslovakian government was~in the hands of 
new leaders. The chain of events in the crisis and the reactions to 
it have influenced Eastern European politics and, especially, law 
since that time. The "doctrine" formulated to explain the invasion 
is an important one. 
The Building of the Crisis 
The August invasion was the culmination of tensions that had 
been developing throughout the previous months. The Czechoslovakians, 
having suffered economically from Soviet planning, were a restive 
people, stirred by growing nationalist sentiments. In January of 
1968 the conservative, pro-Soviet Novotny regime toppled and was 
replaced by a government led by the more liberal Anton Dubcek. The 
Dubcek government soon initiated ~~jor economic adjustments, one of 
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which was a new system of "market socialism." To add to the suspi-
ciously capitalist tendencies, censorship was abolished. Other forms 
1 
of democratization soon followed. 
The scope of Czechoslovakia's moves were not limited to its 
boundaries. People in other countries were excited by the reforms. 
Influenced by a socialist domino theory, however, the government of 
Poland and East Germany appealed to the Kremlin. Both of these 
regimes, conservative and somewhat dependent on Soviet support, felt 
threatened. Accordingly, the Soviet leaders began to impress upon 
the Dubcek government the dangers of their situation. Several 
attempts for a political settlement were ~~de by negotiation, but 
were unsuccessful. Dubcek, caught between domestic demands for more 
freedom and Soviet demands for greater caution and control, lost con-
trol of the course of events. Finally, the Politburo decided that 
force was necessary to preserve socialism in Czechoslovakia. Despite 
unexpected resistance to the invasion, within a few months political 
pressure backed by military force succeeded in reversing the reforms 
. 2 
and installing a more easily controlled reg1me. 
Justification of the Invasion 
It was necessary that the Soviet Union make some statement to 
answer charges from the West and elsewhere that the Warsaw Pact action 
was a violation of international law, The result is what is known as 
1Korbonski, PP• 58-63. 
2Ibid 0' pp. 58-63 0 
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the Brezhnev Doctrine, First published in Pravda on September 26, 1968, 
the theory was given official sanction by First Secretary Brezhnev's 
statement at the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Harkers' Party. 
The Brezhnev Doctrine proposed no new principles of international law, 
but it placed a new emphasis on Soviet L~terpretations of socialist 
international law. Tailored to meet Soviet needs, the Brezhnev Doc-
trine was a significant departure from the i~ge of objectivity that 
the Soviets had been cultivating for the past decade. In brief, there 
was a return to the idea that the Soviet Union serves the cause of 
progress, its actions being therefore legal,J 
The editorial in Pravda in September by Kovalev set forth the 
framework of the doctrine that Soviet leaders needed to justify their 
use of force. The main theme was that the defense of socialism, 
being the highest priority in socialist international law, made neces-
sary and even praiseworthy the Warsaw Pact actions. Resort to force 
in defense of socialism is permissible, This is almost always inter-
preted by Soviet jurists as applying to conflict between socialist and 
capitalist elements. According to co~~ist ideology, peace reigns 
in relations among socialist states. Obviously, there is a contra-
diction here. The contradiction vms rationalized, although not ex-
tremely convincingly, by the assertion that force was exerted against 
anti-socialist elements.4 
3Bernard Ramundo, "Czechoslovakia and the law of Peaceful 
Coexistence , 11 Stanford lsw Review, XXII (Hay 1970) , p. 971. 
4Ibid,, P• 972 • 
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One will remember that the Soviets have been champions of the 
principle of the sovereignty of nation-states. Was not the invasion 
a violation of national sovereignty and of territorial integrity as 
well? The Soviets say this was not a violation. On the contrary, 
the invasion protected Czechoslovakian sovereignty from counter-
revolutionary threats. These threats, of course, originated in the 
capitalist system. In addition, it is the duty of socialist states 
to work for the good of the international socialist movement. National 
interests should be subordinated to international interests.5 Since 
the Soviet Union remains the overwhelmingly dominant power in the 
Eastern European bloc, the Russians determine of what these interests 
consist. 
The socialist obligation to render mutual and fraternal 
assistance served a valuable function in the explanations of the Brezh-
nev Doctrine. The assistance principle justified the action as ~ 
violating the law of non-intervention in the internal affairs of another 
state. It is the duty of socialist cow1tries to preserve the self-
deterrnina tion of the Czechoslovakian people, for self -deter;nina tion 
would be destroyed if capitalism were to be imposed upon them from 
without. The destruction of socialism would result in the loss of 
independence. All these points, as mentioned before, are not especially 
new, but represent a "hard-line" interpretation of previously estab-
lihd . '1 6 's e pr1nclp es. 
5Ibid.' p. 972 0 
6Ibid., P• 97J-6. 
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Besides the hard-line elements in Kovalev's Pravda editorial, 
Brezhnev's speech elaborated some additional points, discussed by 
R. Judson Mitchell. Mitchell's thrust was on the impact of Soviet 
ideology rather than international law itself, but the former most 
definitely influences the latter. Brezhnev co~~ented on areas of 
contradiction within the socialist system. Such statements are quite 
unusual, since in the past the Harxist dogma ~f the resolution of all 
contradictions in the socialist system\was adhered to closeJ.y, 
Brezhnev admitted the presence of class antagonisms due to rerrillants 
of 1the bourgeois element, Furthermore, he cited errors in organi-
zation, the presence of uneven economic development, the rise of 
r.ationalistic feelings, and revisionist ideology. However, here-
affirmed the role of the Party as the vanguard of communism. The 
leadership of the Party is even more necessary than usual due to an 
intensification of the struggle against capitalism,? 
The contradictions within the socialist systems vrere linked 
the threats from outside of the system. The result of this theory has 
been the reversal of Lenin's theory of the weakest link of capitalism. 
Lenin, it will be remembered, stated that the socialist revolution 
would begin at the weakest spot in the capitalist system, Brezhnev in 
1968 found the capitalists to be attacking socialism at its weakest 
link, 8 The close similarity between the two "weakest link'' theories 
7R. Judson l-Iitchell, "The Brezhnev Doctrine: I.rnplications for 
Communist Ideology," presented at Southern Political Science Associa-
tion, International Studies Association, Gatlinburg, Tennessee, 
Nov. 11, 1971, PP• 6-7. 
8Ibid,, PP• 2)-28. 
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is hardly the result of a conscious act. It is a reflection upon 
the nature of socialism in the Soviet Union today. The Soviet Union 
is in an essentially conservative position. It wishes to retain the 
influence that it exerts upon the other socialist countries in Eastern 
Europe, It is willi~g to use force to preserve its influence, 
The Brezhnev Doctrine and Future Policy 
The Brezhnev Doctrine will no doubt influence the future devel-
opment of socialist international law, Although the nominal independ-
ence and sovereignty of socialist countries will continue to be 
stressed, the reality of Soviet domination, backed by the threat of 
force, will continue to effectively curtail that independence. It is 
a mistake to assume that the Soviet domination is as pervasive as it 
was immediately following World War II and the establishment of the 
satellites, For instance, Yugoslavia has been successful in affirming 
her sovereignty and is often vocal in criticizing the Soviet Union, 
This suggests the pragmatic nature of Soviet actions, based on a 
fairly rational assessment of the pros and cons of coercive acts. 
7 
The Czechoslovakian invasion took place not just because (i't}~asserted 
"7 ,____... 
~sovereignty. (~strategic position in relation to the West, the 
7 
domestic climates of~· socialist neighbors, and several other fac-
tors caused perceptions of major threats by some Communists outside 
Czechoslovakia, In the case of Yugoslavia, the Soviets would en-
counter greater costs and benefits from the submission of that country. 
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Comparisons with the United States 
The United States and other countries in the West were out-
raged by the invasion of Czechoslovakia and promptly registered their 
strong disapproval. They charged the Soviet Union with violation of 
international law. The Brezhnev Doctrine, they said, was an~~ 
facto justification of a most distorted nature. However, a few 
scholars accredited the United States with setting precedents for the 
Soviet actions. Said Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, 
virtually every concept of the Brezhnev Doctrine can be traced 
to an earlier version of identical rights by the U.S. vis-a-vis Latin 
America." They note that lavr is based on reciprocal action and the 
development of mutual reciprocal application of normative assumptions. 
The Brezhnev Doctrine served to document that the Soviet 
Union understood that they v1ere acting in accordance with 
established, reciprocal norms of the international system.9 
The last statement is exaggerated, for it seems unlikely that the 
Soviet Union had any such assurance of those norms. Yet there were 
the examples of United States intervention that must have been taken 
into consideration. 
The United States' history of intervention has generally been 
overlooked, while criticisms of the incursions of other nations are 
frequent. It seems that a brief discussion of the U.S. precedents of 
the Soviet invasion is warranted. In June of 1954, the Central 
9Thomas N. Franck and Edmund Weisband, "The Johnson and Brezhnev 
Doctrines; The Law You Lake l-ay Be Your Ovm, 11 Stanford Law Review, .XX 
(l!Jay 1970), PP• 979-982 • -
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Intelligence Agency engineered the overthrow of Arbenz, the Communist-
oriented President of Guatemala, The U.S., with the support of the 
Inter-American Conference, established that Communist aggression was 
taking place and that an attack which "saves" a people from a leftist 
regime is self-defense, If the u.s. claims that communism is incom-
patible with freedom, is it surprising that the Soviet Union asserts 
that capitalistic tendencies are a threat to socialism? 
' \,j ./-/~'-..; ... ~~.~ ~·:) ' 
Despite itsc __ assurances) of .no' aggressive intentions toward 
Cuba, in 1960 the U.S. sponsored the clumsy Bay of Pigs invasion and 
then attempted to keep the matter out of the Security Council and in 
the anti-Communist Organization of American States. The u.s. asserted 
+o 
its right to set norms and 1try to create hemispheric solidarity • 
. \ 
Later, during the 1962 missile crisis, the right to determine when 
self-interest requires military force was stated. 
The invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965 was the most 
serious of U.S. interventions to date. The action was unilateral and 
was intended to insure that the government of the Dorr~ican Republic 
be anti-Co~~unist and favorable to the interests of the u.s. 10 
In these examples, according to Franck and v/eisband, the 
Soviet Union had observed the U.S. acting to preserve its sphere of 
influence in Latin America. The "norms" established, or at least the 
practices used, included that (1) a member of an ideological bloc can-
not withdraw, (2) the community may impose norms, (3) compliance to 
1 olliQ... , PP. 990-101 o. 
6) 
the norrr£ rr~y be judged by members of the co~~unity, (4) force may be 
used on derelict members--in which case it is not aggression, but 
collective self-defense, and (5) invasion may take place under the 
t t f th 't 11 rea y o e commun~ y. 
The moral justifications of both the U.S. a.nd the U.s.s.R. 
are questionable. Whether or not intervention is an established norm 
{)... 
as Franck and Weisband suggest, it is comrr~n in powerful nation's 
sphere of influence. According to Rupert Emerson1 
The realistic issue is still not whether a people is 
qualified for and deserves the r5_ght to determine its own 
destiny, but whether it has the political strength, whir~ 
may well mean the military force to validate its claim. 
Intervention is a political reality--one that has high risks. 
While intervention is a violation of the principles of international 
law, the Soviet Union, as well as the U.S., does intervene. The Nixon 
Doctrine, in principle at least, is designed to alter future American 
behaviour in this respect. Whether it does in practice, a.nd whether 
the Soviets follow suit, will be interesting to observe. 
11Ibid,, PP• 986-987. 
12Rupert Emerson, 11Self Deter11ination," A.rr.erican Journal of 
International Law, LXV,_~o. 3 (July 1971), P• 475. 
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